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As noted in the previous chapter, many psychological factors are related to young 
people’s civic and political engagement. These psychological factors are often 
better predictors of different types of civic and political activity than either social 
or demographic factors (Barrett & Zani, 2015b; Fife-Schaw & Breakwell, 1990). 
They have also been found to mediate the relationship between macro, demo-
graphic and social factors and civic and political activity (Barrett, 2015; Brunton-
Smith, 2011; Brunton-Smith & Barrett, 2014; Cohen, Vigoda & Samorly, 2001; 
Nie, Verba & Kim, 1974).
The present chapter reviews these psychological factors in detail. The specific 
factors that will be examined are the following: political knowledge; political 
attentiveness; political interest; political efficacy; the perceived effectiveness of 
participatory actions; personal, social and collective identities; trust; values; and 
emotions. We begin with political knowledge.
Political knowledge
There are several different types of political knowledge that can be distin-
guished. First, there is knowledge of the characteristics of political regimes and 
the processes related to their functioning. Western societies, where most of the 
research in this field has been conducted, are typically governed through demo-
cratic regimes, and for this reason most studies have examined young people’s 
knowledge of democracy, elections, government, the role of the media, citizen-
ship, rights and responsibilities, freedom, equality, rule of law, etc. Second, there 
is knowledge of current political incumbents, that is, of the individuals who hold 
particular political offices, who currently lead political parties or who are influ-
ential voices and operators within the political system. Third, there is knowledge 
of other current political facts, for example, knowing which political party or 
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parties are in control of the government or the legislature, the main features of 
the ideologies or the policies that are advocated by the main political parties, 
knowledge of political biases in particular media sources, etc.
The importance of political knowledge for both actual and expected future 
electoral participation has been widely documented in the research literature 
(e.g., Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Zukin et al., 2006; Torney-Purta et al., 
2001). For example, CIVED (Torney-Purta et al., 2001) examined 14-year-olds’ 
knowledge of the characteristics of democratic systems. The data were collected 
in 28 countries (see Table 1.2, Chapter 1). A significant correlation was found 
between knowledge of democracy and expectations of future voting – those stu-
dents who had the most knowledge were also the most likely to say that they 
would vote when they became adults, and this knowledge was the single most 
important predictor of the expectation of voting in the future. However, this 
link between political knowledge and participation has been most widely dem-
onstrated in relationship to electoral participation, rather than in relationship to 
other forms of participation. In fact, a more complex pattern emerges when other 
forms of political and civic participation are taken into account.
For example, in ICCS 2016 (Schulz et al., 2017), data were collected from 
14-year-olds in 21 countries (see Table 1.2, Chapter 1). Several measures of 
expected future political participation were used. First, the students were asked 
to estimate the likelihood that they would participate electorally in the future 
(i.e., vote in local elections, vote in national elections, get information about 
candidates before voting in an election, etc.). Second, they were asked to esti-
mate the likelihood that they would engage in the future in legal forms of 
political participation in order to express their opinions (e.g., contact an elected 
representative, take part in a peaceful march or rally, participate in an online 
campaign). Third, they were asked to estimate the likelihood that they would 
engage in illegal forms of political participation in the future in order to express 
their opinions (e.g., spray-paint protest slogans on walls, stage a protest by block-
ing traffic). Fourth, they were asked to estimate how likely they were to engage 
at some future date in other forms of active political participation (e.g., join a 
political party, join a trade union, join an organization committed to a political 
or social cause). The data were analysed to identify the relationships between all 
of these forms of future expected participation and political knowledge.
In all countries, students who had higher levels of knowledge about the 
characteristics of democratic systems were more likely to say that they would 
participate in elections in the future, replicating the previous finding by Torney-
Purta et al. (2001). However, there were few differences associated with levels 
of knowledge in the students’ expectations of participating in legal activities in 
order to express their opinions: those who had low levels of knowledge were as 
likely to say that they would engage in such actions in the future as those who 
had high levels of knowledge. However, when it came to expected participation 
in illegal activities, in every country, students who had lower levels of political 
knowledge were more likely to say that they would participate in illegal protest 
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activities. Also, and rather curiously, expected active political participation was 
higher in 12 of the 21 countries among students who had lower levels of politi-
cal knowledge (there was no significant association between knowledge and 
expected active political participation in the other nine countries). Thus, when 
forms of participation other than electoral participation are used, a varied pat-
tern emerges. The most counter-intuitive finding is the negative relationship 
between political knowledge and expected active political participation in the 
future. Schulz et al. (2017) speculate that more knowledgeable students may be 
more likely to consider their commitments carefully and to understand prop-
erly the constraints that they might experience in pursuing such engagement 
in the future.
Of course, having an expectation that one will engage politically in the future 
may not always translate into actual political action in the future. However, ICCS 
2016 also examined the relationship between the students’ political knowledge 
and their willingness to participate in current school activities, such as voting in 
a school election for a student representative, joining a group of students cam-
paigning for an issue they believed in, participating in discussions in a student 
assembly and writing articles for a school newspaper or website. It was found 
that in 13 out of the 21 countries, political knowledge was related to willing-
ness to participate in these school activities, with more knowledgeable students 
being more willing to participate in these various actions. In another seven 
countries, knowledge was not related to willingness to participate in school 
activities, while in one country (Colombia), political knowledge was actually 
related to being unwilling to participate in school activities (Schulz et al., 2017). 
The different patterns that arose in different countries are noteworthy, revealing 
the need to examine the role of psychological factors in conjunction with macro 
contextual factors.
Overall, it has been found that young people generally have low levels of 
all forms of political knowledge, including knowledge about system processes, 
incumbent political representatives, political facts and current issues (Delli 
Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Putnam, 2001; Wattenberg, 2007). This lack of political 
knowledge may be a significant factor that inhibits young people from engaging 
in civic and political action. Indeed, Pachi, Garbin and Barrett (2011), in a focus 
group study of 16- to 26-year-old British Bangladeshi, Congolese and English 
youth that was conducted as part of PIDOP, found that these youth often felt that 
they did not know enough about political issues to be able to engage in effective 
action to influence political, civic and social change, and cited this as one of the 
main reasons why they were civically and politically disengaged.
As far as demographic variations in political knowledge are concerned, there 
is consistent evidence of a systematic relationship between young people’s politi-
cal knowledge and their SES (Torney-Purta et al., 2001; Schulz et al., 2010, 
2017). For example, ICCS 2016 used parental occupation, parental education 
and the number of books in the family home to measure SES. It was found 
that, on all three measures, higher SES was consistently associated with higher 
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political knowledge scores. This pattern occurred in every country that was 
studied (Schulz et al., 2017). We will revisit these findings in more detail in 
Chapter 3, where we discuss the role of SES at greater length.
There are also sometimes differences in political knowledge as a function of 
gender. For example, in the USA, it has been found that, at the age of 17–18 years, 
males typically have more knowledge than females, especially knowledge about 
political parties, elections and protest activities (Niemi & Junn, 1998; Wolak & 
McDevitt, 2011). However, the gender gap in knowledge tends to be relatively 
small, and there are also some studies that have failed to find a gender differ-
ence in political knowledge. For example, CIVED (Torney-Purta et al., 2001) 
found no statistically significant gender differences in knowledge in 27 of the 
28 countries that were studied (although males did exhibit slightly higher levels 
of knowledge in 11 countries). By contrast, ICCS 2016 found that the females 
actually had higher levels of political knowledge than the males in 19 of the 21 
countries studied (the USA did not participate in this study) (Schulz et al., 2017).
There also tend to be differences in levels of political knowledge as a function 
of the ethnicity of young people. For example, in the USA, African-American 
and Hispanic youth perform significantly worse on standardised tests and surveys 
of political knowledge than White and Asian youth; furthermore, this difference 
is already present by fourth grade and continues all the way through middle and 
high school (Levinson, 2010, 2012). Ethnic group differences were confirmed 
on a larger scale in ICCS 2016, where it was found that, in general, 14-year-olds 
from non-immigrant families had higher political knowledge scores than those 
from immigrant families, and students who spoke the language of school instruc-
tion at home tended to have higher scores than students who did not speak this 
language at home (Schulz et al., 2017).
Before leaving the topic of political knowledge, it should be noted that some 
studies have suggested that knowledge needs to be accompanied by, for exam-
ple, institutional trust or perceptions of an injustice in order for participation to 
occur (Bennett, 2007; Hart & Gullan, 2010; van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 
2008). That is to say, simply having knowledge about system processes, incum-
bent political representatives, political facts or current affairs may not be suf-
ficient in and of itself to mobilise young people to participate – young people 
may also need to engage in cognitive, emotional or ethical appraisals of political 
processes, representatives or current affairs in order to be sufficiently motivated 
to participate, and they may also need to feel that they can be efficacious through 
the particular forms of action that they undertake (see the discussions below on 
emotions, values and political efficacy, respectively).
Political attentiveness
Political attentiveness refers to the extent to which an individual pays atten-
tion to sources of political information such as the news and current affairs, 
documentaries on political events on the radio, television or Internet, political 
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debates and discussions, etc. It has been found that political attentiveness tends 
to be higher in early adulthood than in adolescence (Bennett & Bennett, 1989; 
Fernandez-Jesus, Malafaia, Ribeiro & Menezes, 2015).
Political attentiveness has been treated in the research literature primarily as 
an antecedent of civic and political participation, and higher levels of political 
attentiveness are indeed associated with higher levels of participation (Nie et al., 
1996; Zukin et al., 2006). However, attentiveness may not influence political 
participation directly. This is because attentiveness is also related to internal effi-
cacy (see below), which in turn is known to strongly predict levels of participa-
tion. In addition, it has been found that, in 14- to 18-year-old American youth, 
internal efficacy predicts political attentiveness, with attentiveness then predict-
ing both political knowledge and intentions to vote in future elections (Pasek, 
Feldman, Romer & Jamieson, 2008). In other words, the patterns of causality 
involving attentiveness are probably highly complex, involving reciprocal rela-
tionships with other psychological variables.
Political attentiveness was examined by ICCS 2016, which included questions 
asking the 14-year-olds how often they used television and newspapers to obtain 
information about political and social issues. Overall, 66% of students watched 
television at least once a week in order to obtain information about news, 
whereas only 27% read newspapers at least once a week; however, these figures 
mask considerable variation across countries, with the range being 45%–80% for 
television and 16%–60% for newspapers, depending on the country concerned 
(Schulz et al., 2017). Compared with the findings of the survey conducted in the 
previous round of ICCS in 2009 (Schulz et al., 2010), in which data were col-
lected from 14-year-olds in 38 countries (see Table 1.2, Chapter 1), these figures 
represent a decline in the frequency with which young people are attending to 
political and social issues through the use of traditional media.
It is possible, of course, that young people are turning to new media instead in 
order to access their news and information about political issues. For this reason, 
ICCS 2016 also included questions about whether students used the Internet at 
least once a week for obtaining information about political and social issues, for 
posting comments or images about a political or social issue and for sharing or 
commenting on other people’s online posts about a political or social issue. It was 
found that, overall, 31% of students used the Internet at least once a week to find 
out information about such issues, only 9% posted a comment or image about 
such issues at least once a week and only 10% shared or commented on another 
person’s online post about such issues at least once a week (but again, there were 
considerable variations from one country to another) (Schulz et al., 2017).
In other words, despite the declining use of television as a source of informa-
tion, these 14-year-olds were nevertheless still more likely to use television than 
social media for obtaining information about political or social issues (66% vs. 
31% overall). In addition, there was little relationship between the use of social 
media for obtaining information about political and social issues and levels of 
political knowledge. That said, there is good evidence that the use of television 
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and newspapers is associated with levels of political knowledge in young people 
(this evidence will be reviewed in Chapter 3, where we discuss the effects of the 
mass media in more detail). Thus, the idea that social media are now serving as 
a significant source of information and news for young people does not receive 
support from the findings of ICCS 2016.
Finally, it is important to note that political attentiveness sometimes has oppo-
site relationships to participation depending on the specific form of participa-
tion that is involved. For example, as part of PIDOP, Brunton-Smith (2011) 
analysed data from the European Social Survey (ESS), which had been collected 
in 20 countries from youth aged 15–24 years old and from adults aged 25 years 
and older. He found that, in both age groups, higher attentiveness to political 
issues was associated with a higher tendency to vote and to participate civically 
but with a lower tendency to engage in non-conventional political participa-
tion. The fact that a single psychological variable such as attentiveness is related 
in opposite directions to different kinds of participatory behaviour implies that 
interventions aimed at boosting participation rates by increasing political atten-
tiveness need to consider precisely which behaviours are being targeted, and also 
need to be mindful that other behaviours may be negatively affected as a conse-
quence of the intervention.
Political interest
Political interest refers to the interest that an individual has in politics and politi-
cal issues. Interest has sometimes been conceptualised as the converse of political 
apathy (Bynner & Ashford, 1994). There are scales that have been designed to 
measure political apathy, for example the Political Apathy Scale (e.g., Bennett, 
1986), as well as scales to measure political interest more directly (e.g., Barrett & 
Zani, 2015b).
It has been consistently found that young people show lower levels of interest 
in conventional politics than adults, with many considering traditional politics 
to be ‘boring’, ‘irrelevant’ to their lives, ineffective and incomprehensible (Kiesa 
et al., 2007; Marsh et al., 2007; Zukin et al., 2006). Russo and Stattin (2017) 
conducted a longitudinal study into changes in levels of political interest among 
Swedish youth aged between 13 and 28 years old. They found that instability in 
levels of political interest was most pronounced between 13 to 15 years of age, 
but that interest became more stable with increasing age, especially from the 
early twenties onwards.
Political interest tends to be conceptualised as a psychological predisposition, 
which alongside political knowledge and political attentiveness leads to civic and 
political participation. And indeed, it has been found that, in both youth and 
adult populations, the more interest a person shows in political issues, the more 
likely they are to participate in civic and political activities (see, e.g., Brady et al., 
1995; Brunton-Smith, 2011; Schulz, 2005; Schulz et al., 2017). Thus, Emler 
(2011), for example, proposes that political interest functions as the initial factor 
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that leads to political participation. He suggests that interest stimulates political 
attentiveness, which in turn leads to political knowledge, with knowledge lead-
ing to opinionation and to political participation.
However, the causality between interest and participation may sometimes 
actually run not from interest to participation but in the opposite direction, from 
participation to interest. Evidence on this issue is reported by Šerek, Machackova 
and Macek (2017), who conducted a longitudinal analysis of the relationship 
between young people’s interest in politics and their political participation. The 
data were collected from Czech youth aged 14 to 17 years old. The analyses 
revealed an effect of participating in protests on political interest (but no effects 
of volunteering or of engaging with elections or elected representatives on 
 interest). There were also no significant effects in the opposite direction, from 
political interest to participation.
The links between political interest and both political knowledge and politi-
cal attentiveness are very close and are probably also bi-directional. Young peo-
ple who learn about political issues and processes have been found to be more 
interested in political issues, and similarly young people who are interested in 
political issues show a preference for resources that allow them to learn more 
about political issues. Furthermore, it is difficult to isolate factors that promote 
or hinder one of these three variables without affecting the others simultaneously 
(Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996).
Education is an important factor that has been found to be related to inter-
est in many studies. For example, Emler and Frazer (1999) report that, in the 
case of British 16- to 19-year-olds, both the level of educational attainment 
and the amount of post-16 education are related to political interest. Likewise, 
Cicognani, Zani, Fournier, Gavray and Born (2012) report that, in Italy, 18-year-
old students who are on an academic educational track rather than a technical or 
vocational track have higher levels of political interest. It also seems likely that 
engaging in political discussions further contributes to young people’s political 
interest. ICCS 2016 found that political interest was strongly and consistently 
related to the extent to which 14-year-old students discussed political and social 
issues outside school with parents and with friends; this finding arose in every 
country that was studied (Schulz et al., 2017). Once again, the causality here is 
probably bi-directional, with interest leading to discussions and discussions fur-
ther strengthening interest.
It has also been reported that SES is linked to political interest in at least some 
populations of youth. For example, Bynner and Ashford (1994) studied British 16- 
to 19-year-old youth. They found that lack of political interest and intention not 
to vote were associated with low SES, poor educational performance and cynicism 
about politics. That said, ICCS 2009 only found associations between SES and stu-
dents’ political interest in some rather than all countries, and even in those coun-
tries where the association was present, it was relatively small (Schulz et al., 2010).
In the USA, a gender gap in levels of political interest has been reported 
by Bennett and Bennett (1989), with females typically having less interest in 
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politics than males. Dassonneville, Quintelier, Hooghe and Claes (2012) also 
found a gender gap in favour of males in a study of 16- and 18-year-old Belgian 
youth. However, other studies have reported the opposite pattern in levels of 
interest between males and females. For example, Haste and Hogan (2006), 
in a study of British youth aged between 11 and 21 years old, found high 
levels of interest towards both social and political issues among females, with 
the females displaying a higher level of interest in social and environmen-
tal issues than males. Similarly, Pachi and Barrett (2012a; Pachi, Garbin & 
Barrett, 2011), in their focus group study of British Bangladeshi, Congolese 
and English 16- to 26-year-olds, found that the females tended to have just as 
much political interest as the males.
Political efficacy
Another important construct that has been linked to civic and political par-
ticipation is political efficacy (Craig, Niemi & Silver, 1990; Delli Carpini & 
Keeter, 1996; Klandermans, 2002a; Schulz, 2005; van Zomeren, Postmes & 
Spears, 2008). Three distinct forms of efficacy have been distinguished in the 
research literature: internal, external and collective efficacy. Each of these forms 
has different antecedents and different consequences for civic and political par-
ticipation. Internal political efficacy is the belief that one understands political issues 
and is able to participate effectively in political situations; external political efficacy 
is the belief that politicians and political institutions are responsive to citizens’ 
demands; while collective political efficacy is the belief that a collective group to 
which one belongs is able to have an effect on political situations.
There is a strong and consistent relationship in both adults and youth between 
political participation and internal efficacy: the higher the level of internal effi-
cacy, the higher the level of both actual participation and future intended par-
ticipation (Blais, 2010; Brunton-Smith, 2011; Schulz et al., 2010; Schulz et al., 
2017; Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995). For example, ICCS 2016 found that, at 
14 years of age, internal efficacy was significantly related to both expected elec-
toral participation and expected active political participation (e.g., working on 
a political campaign or running for office) in all 21 countries that were studied 
(Schulz et al., 2017).
Similarly, the higher the level of external efficacy, the more likely the indi-
vidual is to participate in the political processes that are controlled by the actors 
who are perceived to be responsive to the demands of citizens (Abramson & 
Aldrich, 1982; Craig et al., 1990; O’Toole et al., 2003; Pachi and Barrett, 2011a; 
Rosenstone & Hanser, 1993). When people do not believe that politicians or 
policymakers will take people’s demands and needs into consideration, then they 
are less motivated to participate (Soss, 1999). Interestingly, O’Toole (2004), in 
a study of British youth aged 16 to 25 years, found that these youth differenti-
ated between national and local scale politics. They felt that mainstream national 
politicians were unresponsive to their needs and that they could not have any 
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impact on decision-making at the national level. In contrast, they felt much 
more efficacious with respect to local political issues, issues which are treated on 
a smaller scale and which they perceived as having a direct effect on their own 
lives and their peers’ and families’ lives.
Collective efficacy in youth has been less extensively studied than either inter-
nal or external efficacy. However, collective efficacy has been identified as one 
of the main predictors of participation in collective action (i.e., organised social 
or political action carried out by a group of people to try to achieve a shared col-
lective goal – marches, protests and demonstrations are typical examples). In a 
meta-analysis of 53 studies of collective action, several of which included youth 
as participants, van Zomeren et al. (2008) found clear evidence that collective 
efficacy predicts participation in such action. However, collective efficacy may 
affect participation in collective action indirectly rather than directly. For exam-
ple, Jugert et al. (2016) found that collective efficacy is related to participation 
in pro-environmental behaviour among German 18- to 30-year-olds, but this 
effect is indirect; the perception that the collective group is capable of reaching 
its collective goals leads to an increased sense of internal efficacy, which in turn 
then motivates individuals to act on behalf of the group. One context within 
which the sense of collective efficacy among young individuals has been studied 
is the school: CIVED (Torney-Purta et al., 2001) examined the extent to which 
the 14-year-old students felt that, by working together, they could help to solve 
school problems. It was found that the majority of students had a moderately 
positive sense of collective efficacy in this context.
As far as the development of efficacy is concerned, Schulz (2005) explored this 
issue using CIVED data which had been collected not only from 14-year-olds 
but also from 17- to 18-year-olds (Amadeo, Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Husfeldt & 
Nikolova, 2002). He examined differences in both internal and external effi-
cacy between 14-year-olds and 17- to 18-year-olds from 10 countries, and found 
that levels of internal efficacy increased across this age range, while levels of 
external political efficacy decreased. In other words, self-confidence in dealing 
with political issues and taking political action increased, while beliefs about the 
responsiveness of the political system to citizens’ demands decreased. In addition, 
Schulz found that internal efficacy had a consistently positive relationship to 
expectations of becoming more actively involved in politics in the future at both 
ages, whereas external efficacy only had a relatively weak relationship to future 
expected involvement.
In terms of its relationship to other factors, internal efficacy is strongly related 
to political interest. This finding was obtained by Schulz (2005) in the analyses 
of the CIVED data and also by Schulz et al. (2017) in their analyses of the data 
from ICCS 2016. Indeed, the latter revealed a clear relationship between stu-
dents’ internal efficacy and their interest in political and social issues in all 21 
countries that were studied. Exactly the same finding was obtained by Brunton-
Smith (2011) in his analyses of ESS data in PIDOP. Indeed, he found that inter-
nal efficacy and political interest were so highly correlated with one another that 
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they effectively formed a single factor that was positively related to levels of par-
ticipation: among those who had high levels of both internal efficacy and politi-
cal interest, there were consistently higher levels of all forms of participation (i.e., 
voting, other forms of conventional political participation, non- conventional 
participation and civic participation). Furthermore, these same relationships 
were found to be present in those who were aged between 16 and 24 years as 
well as in those who were aged 25 years and older.
In addition, the analyses of CIVED data by Schulz (2005) revealed that exter-
nal efficacy, perhaps not unexpectedly, is related to trust in institutions (govern-
ment, local council, courts, police, parties and parliament). He also found that 
internal efficacy is related to political discussions with peers and parents and to 
the frequency of using media (newspapers, television and radio) for obtaining 
information about national and international issues.
Once again, there are demographic group differences in levels of efficacy. For 
example, a link between internal efficacy and SES has been found: youth whose 
families have a higher income and a higher educational level tend to have higher 
levels of internal efficacy (Schulz, 2005; Schulz et al., 2017). Youth from higher 
SES families are more likely to have access to resources such as time, money and 
opportunities for participation, all of which will enable them to acquire civic 
and political skills and attitudes such as internal efficacy and political interest 
that will enable them to participate civically and politically (cf. Brady et al., 
1995). SES has also been found to be related to external efficacy, with those 
who have attained higher educational levels and higher incomes believing more 
in politicians’ and government’s responsiveness to people’s needs (Flanagan 
et al., 2003; Soss, 1999; Wu, 2003). In addition, it has been reported that women 
and girls sometimes feel less efficacious than men and boys (Easton & Dennis, 
1967; Goel & Milbrath, 1977; Lyons & Menezes, 2012), although there are also 
other studies that have not found any gender differences (e.g., Vecchione & 
Caprara, 2009; Wu, 2003). We discuss demographic differences in greater detail 
in Chapter 3.
While it is tempting to conclude that internal and external efficacy are causal 
factors that impact on participation, the causality that is involved here is almost 
certainly bi-directional. Quintelier and van Deth (2014) conducted a three-wave 
longitudinal study in which data were collected from Belgian adolescents when 
they were aged 16, 18 and 21 years old. They found that there was a reciprocal 
causal effect between political participation and internal efficacy, but the effects 
of political participation on internal efficacy were much stronger than the effects 
of efficacy on participation. These findings are consistent with those of Šerek 
et al. (2017), whose longitudinal study, which was conducted with Czech youth 
aged 14 to 17 years old, revealed that participation in protests strengthened both 
internal and external efficacy (as well as political interest), and that participa-
tion in volunteering activities strengthened external efficacy. It therefore seems 
highly likely that there is a reciprocal causal relationship between internal effi-
cacy and participation.
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Perceived effectiveness of participatory actions
A further construct that is closely related to external political efficacy is the per-
ceived effectiveness of different participatory actions. Despite the significance of 
this construct, it has not received much attention to date, apart from a few stud-
ies that have been conducted with adult populations (e.g., Klandermans, 1984; 
Simon et al., 1998). In these studies, perceived effectiveness has been linked to 
people’s cost-benefit calculations when they make decisions about which forms 
of action to take.
Notice that the perceived effectiveness of particular actions is distinct from 
external efficacy (i.e., the extent to which one believes that politicians and politi-
cal institutions are responsive to citizens’ demands). For example, one can feel 
that government is generally not responsive to citizens’ demands (i.e., have a low 
sense of external efficacy), but in attempting to persuade a government about 
one’s case, the judgement might still be made that, say, participating in a militant 
action (e.g., a mass protest on the streets) is more likely to be effective than par-
ticipating in a moderate action (e.g., signing an e-petition).
Young people’s perceptions of the effectiveness of different forms of conven-
tional, non-conventional and civic participation were examined by Pachi and 
Barrett (2012a) as part of PIDOP. The data were collected from 16- to 26-year-old 
British Bangladeshi, Congolese and English youth living in London using focus 
groups. The findings revealed differences in judgements about the effectiveness of 
action across ethnic groups, genders and ages. As far as ethnic group differences 
were concerned, English majority young people believed more in the effectiveness 
of conventional forms of participation (such as voting) than ethnic minority young 
people. However, gender differences were also apparent; for example, the effective-
ness of actions based on membership of a religious organisation was more salient 
among the female participants. In addition, age differences were present: older par-
ticipants, in contrast to younger participants, gave greater emphasis to the effective-
ness of participation through charities, which was seen as effective for ensuring the 
distribution of benefits to those who are most in need and for helping disadvantaged 
groups in society, as well as being important for personal development and enrich-
ment. Differences based on the intersection between ethnicity, gender and age were 
also apparent. For example, as far as non-conventional forms of participation, such 
as spraying graffiti and joining demonstrations were concerned, these were largely 
rejected by the females who were below voting age and by the ethnic minority 
males who were above voting age, who argued that these actions were ineffective 
due to the fact that they involved breaking the law; thus, the perceived legality 
or illegality of actions was a particularly salient consideration for these particular 
subgroups of participants. More generally, personal experience of different forms of 
participatory action, perceptions of the effectiveness of different organisations, the 
personal need for expression and perceptions of discrimination were all widespread 
justifications that were given by these young people for their evaluations of the 
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the various forms of action that were discussed.
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Identities
Youth is a critical period in human development for exploring and developing 
identities and for thinking about one’s own position and possible future roles 
within society (Erikson, 1963, 1968; Kroger, 2004, 2007). A central aspect of 
identity development during this period is reflecting on and considering one’s 
role as a citizen within the wider social, civic and political communities in which 
one lives. The identity commitments that are made (or not made) can have 
important implications for civic and political behaviour.
There are many different types of identities that may be explored during 
youth. Some are based on personal attributes (e.g. studious, fun-loving), some on 
interpersonal relationships and roles (e.g. daughter, friend, student) and some on 
autobiographical narratives (e.g., born in London to middle class parents, edu-
cated at a state school) (Stryker, 1980; Deaux, 1992, 1996). Other identities may 
be based on membership of social groups (such as a nation, an ethnic group, a 
religious group, a gender group, a neighbourhood, or a school). When member-
ship of a particular social group forms a salient part of one’s self-concept, so that 
emotional significance and value is attributed to that group membership, then 
the person is said to have acquired a social identity (Tajfel, 1978). Furthermore, 
in cases where a number of people share the same social identity, feel solidarity 
with one another and take action together to pursue the goals of the group, they 
may be said to have acquired a collective identity (Klandermans, 1997). These 
multiple identifications with different attributes, relationships, roles, narratives 
and social groups help individuals to define, position and orientate themselves 
relative to other people, and can have significant consequences for individuals’ 
civic and political behaviour.
Numerous researchers have built on Erikson’s (1963, 1968) account of iden-
tity development during adolescence, with the most well-known body of work 
being that conducted by Marcia (1966; Marcia, Waterman, Matteson, Archer & 
Orlofsky, 1993). However, a more recent account, namely the three-factor iden-
tity model, has been used explicitly to explore the relationship between iden-
tity development and civic and political participation. The three-factor model 
proposes that identity development during adolescence involves an interplay 
between three key processes: identity commitment (which refers to the firm iden-
tity choices that have been made), identity exploration (which refers to the extent 
to which current identity commitments have been reflected upon and examined 
by searching for information and speaking to others about those identities) and 
reconsideration of commitment (which refers to the comparison of present identity 
commitments with alternative possible commitments when existing commit-
ments are judged to be unsatisfactory) (Crocetti, Rubini & Meeus, 2008; Meeus, 
1996; Meeus, Iedema, Helsen & Vollebergh, 1999; and Meeus, van de Schoot, 
Keijsers, Schwartz & Branje, 2010).
From the interplay between these processes, specific identity statuses emerge. 
Specifically, youth who have an achievement status are those who have strong 
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identity commitments that have been explored deeply and are not being recon-
sidered. Youth who have an early closure status have moderate identity commit-
ments that have been neither explored nor reconsidered properly. Youth who 
have a moratorium status have low commitments to identities and are reconsider-
ing these commitments in search of more satisfying alternatives that have a better 
fit to their needs and aspirations. Finally, youth who have a diffusion status have 
low commitments, have engaged in little identity exploration and are not recon-
sidering their commitments (Crocetti, Schwartz, Fermani, Klimstra & Meeus, 
2012; Meeus et al., 2010).
Interestingly, links have been found between these various identity statuses 
and patterns of civic engagement. Crocetti, Jahromi and Meeus (2012) con-
ducted a study with Italian high school students aged between 14 and 20 years 
old. It was found that those youth who had an achieved identity status were 
more involved in volunteer activities, reported higher levels of efficacy and had 
stronger aspirations to contribute to their communities than those who had a 
diffused status. In addition, a link was found between identity processes (i.e., 
commitment and exploration) and past and future volunteer activities, with the 
relationship between identity and future volunteering and future political par-
ticipation being mediated by these young people’s sense of civic duty.
Different identity styles have also been found to have consequences for pat-
terns of participation. A distinction may be drawn between youth who have 
an information-oriented style (who actively seek out and evaluate identity-relevant 
information), those who have a normative style (who readily adopt the prescrip-
tions and expectations of others) and those who have a diffuse-avoidant style (who 
delay the identity formation task for as long as possible) (Berzonsky, 2011). 
Crocetti, Erentaitė and Žukauskienė (2014) used these distinctions in a study of 
14- to 19-year-old youth in Lithuania and found that youth who had an infor-
mation-oriented style were more likely to participate in volunteering activities 
than those who had a normative or diffuse-avoidant style. Collecting a second set 
of data from the same youth one year later, Crocetti, Garckija, Gabrialaviciute, 
Vosylis and Žukauskienė (2014) further found that identity style was relatively 
stable over time, with the effects of identity style on civic behaviour being 
stronger than the effects of civic behaviour on identity style. That said, higher 
levels of participation in civic activities at the earlier point in time did reduce 
the tendency of those adolescents who originally had a diffuse-avoidant style to 
persist in the avoidance of identity issues.
Collective identities are particularly important in relationship to civic and 
political participation, because they can act as strong motivators to undertake 
collective action on behalf of the group. They help young people to articu-
late common grievances and common goals, which can politicise them and lead 
them to act together to change the prevailing situation (Klandermans, 2014, 
2015; Simon, 2011; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; van Zomeren et al., 2008). 
Martínez, Peñaloza and Valenzuela (2012) provide a good example in a study 
of Chilean youth who were aged 16 to 24 years old. These youth identified 
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with social and political causes and integrated them into their own identities. 
Their sustained social action was related to their identification with the goals of 
the collective group organisations to which they belonged, and their accounts 
conveyed a collective sense of ‘we’ that was developed through working toward 
shared goals with the other members of these organisations.
Ethnic identity, in particular, can function as a powerful collective identity for 
young people who belong to ethnic minority groups and can motivate their civic 
and political participation. For example, in the USA, Jensen (2008) interviewed 
second generation immigrant youth aged between 14 and 18 years old, nearly 
all of whom regarded political and civic engagement as important. Some were 
highly active participants, especially at the community level. One-third were 
engaged in community activities that specifically had a cultural focus or occurred 
through cultural organisations, and their motivations were based on their eth-
nic or immigrant identities. In another study, Lyons, Chrysanthaki, Verkuyten, 
Selivanov and Pavlenko (2008) collected data from 15- to 18-year-old ethnic 
minority youth in England, the Netherlands, Greece, Spain, Russia, Azerbaijan, 
Ukraine and Georgia, focusing in particular on their use of the Internet in sup-
port of minority rights. It was found that there was a strong positive relationship 
between levels of ethnic identification and the likelihood of using the Internet in 
support of these rights. Likewise, van Bergen, Feddes, Doosje and Pels (2015), in 
a study of 14- to 18-year-old Muslim Dutch youth, found that their connected-
ness to their ethnic group (defined as their emotional attachment to and under-
standing of the culture of that group) predicted their willingness to use violence 
to defend their ethnic group. All of these findings are consistent with the notion 
that a minority ethnic identity, if transformed into a politicised collective iden-
tity, can be a powerful motivator of civic and political action for minority youth 
(Pachi, Chrysanthaki & Barrett, 2014).
However, as we have noted already, young people are in the process of devel-
oping not just a single but multiple identities during adolescence. Much of the 
research literature in this field addresses single identities and ignores their inter-
sections. In real life, people’s beliefs, emotions and behaviours are usually the 
product of a complex system of multiple identities, which sometimes interact 
in a complementary way and sometimes in a conflicting way. For example, 
Chryssochoou and Lyons (2011) found that a perceived incompatibility between 
national and ethnic/religious identities was negatively related to levels of politi-
cal participation among 15- to 18-year-old Muslim youth in Spain and the 
Netherlands.
Another collective identity that can be important for young people is their 
identification with their school. The school is a space of common experiences for 
students, and this can reinforce their identification both with the group’s space 
and with its members. It has been found with American 11- to 17-year-olds that 
the sense of solidarity with classmates predicts the motivation to act on behalf of 
the common good by protecting both the school space and other school mem-
bers (Flanagan, Stoppa, Syvertsen & Stout, 2010). Thus, when young people are 
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given the opportunity to identify with a collective community, they can develop 
a sense of emotional belonging, trust and solidarity with that community, which 
in turn can lead them into active engagement (Kassimir & Flanagan, 2010).
Finally, it should be noted that most research examining the relationship 
between identities and civic and political participation has tended to regard iden-
tification as an antecedent of participation. The study by Crocetti et al. (2014), 
which was discussed above, is an exception in this regard. There is, in fact, very 
good evidence that, in adults, collective action itself can strengthen collective 
identities in particular (Klandermans, 1997, 2002; Reicher & Drury, 2010). It 
seems highly likely that the same phenomenon occurs in youth as well, with the 
causal relationship between collective identification and participation in collec-
tive action being reciprocal.
Trust
Trust has been conceptualised at an interpersonal, social, political and institu-
tional level (Citrin & Muste, 1999; Newton, 2001, 2013; Weatherford, 1987). To 
trust someone or something is to believe that they are honest, well-intentioned, 
will not knowingly or willingly do you harm and at best will act in your inter-
ests. Interpersonal trust is the belief that another specific individual is trustworthy; 
social trust is more generalised, and is the belief that most other people in broader 
society are trustworthy; political trust is the belief that political actors and insti-
tutions ranging from politicians to the incumbent government to the political 
regime of a country are trustworthy; and institutional trust is the belief that societal 
institutions such as the police, courts, media, educational institutions, banks, 
companies, etc., are trustworthy.
CIVED (Torney-Purta et al., 2001) measured 14-year-olds’ trust in national 
government, national parliament, political parties, local government, courts, the 
police, news on television, news on the radio, news in newspapers, the United 
Nations, school and the people who live within the respondent’s own country. 
ICCS 2009 (Schulz et al., 2010) used a similar set of items to those used in 
CIVED, while ICCS 2016 measured trust using the same set of items as ICCS 
2009, together with an additional item that measured trust in social media 
(Schulz et al., 2017). These three studies between them revealed that, in general, 
14-year-olds tend to express the lowest levels of trust in political parties and the 
highest levels of trust in courts of justice. However, in countries which have 
high scores on indices of corruption and low scores on indices of government 
efficiency, more politically knowledgeable students tend to have less trust in 
institutions; by contrast, in countries which have low scores on indices of cor-
ruption, more politically knowledgeable students tend to have higher levels of 
trust in institutions (Lauglo, 2013; Schulz et al., 2017). ICCS 2016 also revealed 
changes in students’ levels of trust between 2009 and 2016: in many countries, 
the ICCS 2016 students had higher levels of trust than their 2009 counterparts 
in government, parliament and courts of justice; however, they expressed lower 
 Psychological factors 37
levels of trust in media and people in general. As far as trust in social media is 
concerned, ICCS 2016 found that social media were trusted less than traditional 
media (television, newspapers and radio). This could be the reason why students 
are more likely to use television rather than social media for obtaining informa-
tion about political and social issues (cf. the discussion above in the section on 
political attentiveness).
Torney-Purta, Barber and Richardson (2004) also used the CIVED data to 
examine the relationship between trust in institutions and civic and political par-
ticipation in six of the countries in which data had been collected from 14-year-
olds. They found a relationship between institutional trust and expected future 
voting, volunteering, joining a political party and writing letters to a newspa-
per about social or political concerns. In addition, they found that institutional 
trust itself is sometimes predicted by reading articles in newspapers about current 
affairs (an index of political attentiveness). However, the relationship between 
trust and participation was fairly modest in magnitude, and other psychologi-
cal factors (e.g., political knowledge) were much more powerful predictors of 
expected future civic and political participation.
However, the relationship between institutional trust and different forms 
of participation might not only be modest in strength. This relationship might 
actually vary in its direction depending on the particular form of participation 
involved. Evidence suggesting that this is the case is reported by Brunton-Smith 
(2011) in his analyses of data from the ESS, which were collected in 20 coun-
tries from youth aged 15–24 years old and from adults aged 25 years and older. 
He found that, in both age groups, institutional trust did indeed have different 
relationships with different forms of participation. For example, individuals with 
higher levels of institutional trust were more likely to vote, but they were less 
likely to participate in non-conventional political activities such as participating 
in public demonstrations and signing petitions. This finding does make intuitive 
sense, insofar as people who have high levels of institutional trust might not feel 
the need to take any action outside conventional channels because of their high 
level of trust in their elected representatives (cf. Amnå & Ekman’s, 2014, 2015, 
concept of the standby citizen discussed in Chapter 1).
Finally, as far as social trust is concerned, Kelly (2009) explored the link 
between social trust and participation in American youth aged between 15 and 
25 years old. She found that both ethnic majority and ethnic minority youths 
who had high levels of social trust were more likely to have performed voluntary 
service in the community within the 12 months prior to the study and were 
more likely to value the practice of voting than those who had low levels of social 
trust. In addition, ethnic minority youths who had high levels of social trust 
were more likely to say that they would engage in political volunteering; this 
relationship was not present in the majority youth. However, the causality here is 
ambiguous. It could be the case that high levels of social trust motivate individu-
als into voluntary service and valuing voting. Alternatively, it could be the case 
that when young people engage in strengthening their communities through 
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voluntary service and through voting, social trust is enhanced. Longitudinal 
data are really required to determine the direction of the causality that operates 
between trust (of all kinds) and participation. Unfortunately, such data from 
youth do not currently exist on this issue.
Values
Values are another set of psychological factors that can motivate civic and politi-
cal participation. Values are general beliefs that individuals hold about the desira-
ble goals that should be striven for in life (Schwartz, 2006, 2013). They motivate 
people’s actions and serve as broad guiding principles for deciding how to act. 
They also provide standards or criteria for evaluating actions, people and events. 
Values transcend specific situations, and as such they are much broader than atti-
tudes (which instead are usually focused on specific actions, objects or events). 
In addition, and importantly, values have a normative-prescriptive quality about 
what ought to be done or thought across many different contexts. They therefore 
differ from attitudes in this respect as well, because attitudes do not carry the 
same kind of prescriptive quality.
In an audit of the literature on the psychological factors related to young peo-
ple’s democratic competence, Barrett (2016) examined 101 conceptual schemes 
that purport to describe these factors. Examining the values contained in these 
schemes, he found that they commonly contained the valuing of justice, fair-
ness, equality, democracy and the rule of law as components of democratic 
competence.
In fact, research indicates that valuing justice can be a particularly powerful 
value for motivating civic and political participation. This is because a social jus-
tice orientation can readily generate a deep sense of injustice when violations of 
just and fair principles are perceived, which in turn can lead to anger. This set of 
psychological conditions has been identified in many different national contexts 
as one of the primary motivations behind collective action among both adults 
and youth (van Zomeren et al., 2004, 2008). We return to the role of anger 
below, when we discuss emotions.
However, it is not only collective action that may be motivated by justice 
considerations. Neufeind, Jiranek and Wehner (2014) studied the role of justice 
considerations in volunteering, conventional political participation and partici-
pating in collective protests among a group of Swiss youth who had a mean age 
of 23 years. They found that these young people’s beliefs about justice predicted 
the extent of their volunteering as well as their political participation. Likewise, 
Luengo Kanacri, Rosa and Di Giunta (2012) studied the role of benevolence 
(i.e., valuing the welfare of those with whom one is in frequent personal contact) 
and universalism (i.e., valuing the appreciation, tolerance and protection of the 
welfare of all people) among 19- to 29-year-old Italian youth. It was found that 
these two values were related to one another and that benevolence (but not uni-
versalism) directly predicted membership of civic associations (e.g., associations 
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for the protection of human rights, trade unions, volunteer social service asso-
ciations). By contrast, valuing power (i.e., valuing social status and control or 
dominance over other people and resources) predicted membership of political 
associations.
Flanagan, Gallay, Gill, Gallay and Nti (2005) examined the values held by 
12- to 19-year-old American youth. They explored these youths’ definitions of 
democracy, the values they endorsed and whether the aspects of democracy that 
they found personally meaningful were concordant with their families’ values. 
It was found that those who were older, came from better educated families, 
discussed current events at home and participated in extracurricular activities 
in school or in the community were more likely to define democracy correctly. 
The meanings that these young people ascribed to democracy were freedom, 
individual rights, civic equality, popular sovereignty and representative govern-
ment. Social vigilance (i.e., wariness of other people who might take advantage 
and get an upper hand) and materialism were more prominent values for those 
youth whose families’ views of democracy emphasised individual rights. By con-
trast, responsibility for the environment and for people in need were the values 
reported by youth whose families emphasised equality. Youth from more edu-
cated families were more likely to endorse social and environmental responsibil-
ity and were less likely to endorse materialist values and social vigilance.
In a study of British youth aged between 11 and 21 years, Haste and Hogan 
(2006) examined the issues that were of concern to them and the values that they 
held. It was found that there were three different sets of issues that concerned 
these young people: quality of life and social order (e.g., facilities for young 
people, health care, opportunities for women and controlling crime); perceived 
threats to national or cultural sovereignty (e.g., the effects of other countries on 
British politics and immigration control); and environmental issues and animal 
experimentation. Haste and Hogan report that these patterns were linked to 
three different moral orientations: an ethic of care, community and responsibil-
ity; an ethic of protecting the state and formal institutional action; and an ethic 
based on single issues and social activism. The first and third value orientations 
were more likely to be adopted by females, while the second orientation was 
more likely to be adopted by males.
Additional evidence about the role of values in young people’s political and 
civic participation comes from a study of American 17- to 18-year-old students 
conducted by Malin, Ballard and Damon (2015). They found that, among those 
who were politically or civically engaged, concern about civic and political issues 
was usually accompanied by strongly held values, including concerns about injus-
tice, the need to help others and the importance of the family. Distinguishing 
between traditional political activity (e.g., discussing political issues, attending 
demonstrations), expressive activity (e.g., expressing political opinions, contact-
ing elected representatives) and community service (e.g., volunteering in the 
community, fundraising), Malin et al. found that community service had the 
most purposeful and involved participants, with these particular individuals 
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having the most sustained and strongest intentions to contribute to the world 
beyond the self.
An alternative perspective on the role of values is provided by young people’s 
conceptions of what is meant by ‘good’ citizenship. Dalton (2008), in a study of 
American youth and adults, found that two broad dimensions characterised their 
views of what constitutes good citizenship. One dimension valued citizen duty: 
voting in elections, never evading taxes, serving in the military, obeying the 
law, reporting crime and serving on a jury. The other dimension instead valued 
citizen engagement: helping those who are worse off than oneself, both in one’s 
own country and in the world, choosing products for political, ethical or envi-
ronmental reasons, understanding others, being active in voluntary groups and 
associations, being active in politics and forming one’s own opinions. The former 
is focused on allegiance to the state and the existing political order, whereas the 
latter is focused more on the moral and empathetic aspects of citizenship.
Breaking the results down by generation, Dalton found that adherence to 
citizen duty values was highest amongst the elderly and lowest amongst youth, 
whereas adherence to citizen engagement values showed the opposite pattern, 
being highest amongst youth and lowest amongst the elderly. Dalton further 
found that these two different value orientations predicted individuals’ tolerance 
for others, support for civil liberties, support for minority rights and priorities 
for government spending. The orientations also predicted the forms of politi-
cal and civic activity that were undertaken by individuals: those who adhered 
to citizen duty values were more likely to vote, whereas those who adhered to 
citizen engagement values were more likely to participate in demonstrations and 
consumer activism. Note that these findings echo those discussed in Chapter 
1 on the shift among young people away from conventional political partici-
pation towards non-conventional political participation and civic participa-
tion – Dalton’s findings imply that this shift is a consequence of a difference in 
the values that are held by young people vs. older individuals.
Dalton’s conclusions, which were drawn from American data, were examined 
more broadly by Hooghe, Oser and Marien (2016) using the ICCS 2009 data 
that had been collected from 14-year-olds in 38 countries. Hooghe et al. found 
that they could also identify groups of individuals who adhered either to engaged 
citizenship values or to duty-based values. Those who adhered to engaged citi-
zenship values (about 25% of the sample) attributed importance to protecting 
the environment, protecting human rights and helping others in the local com-
munity, and downplayed the importance of voting and joining a political party; 
those who adhered to duty-based values (about 20% of the sample) displayed the 
converse pattern. However, together, these two groups only accounted for 45% 
of the 14-year-olds, with the other 55% not fitting into Dalton’s binary typology. 
These individuals instead showed one of three further profiles. A small group 
(about 6%) did not attribute importance to any of the citizenship behaviours 
examined and simply regarded themselves as subjects who should obey govern-
ment and authorities rather than actively participate. A larger group (about 18%) 
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was characterised by attributing importance to many citizen behaviours but not 
to discussing politics or to joining a political party. The largest group (about 
32%) viewed all citizen behaviours as being important. The differences between 
Dalton’s and Hooghe et al.’s findings may well be due to the fact that the former 
were derived from older individuals, with the patterns displayed by the 14-year-
olds being more characteristic of younger individuals whose citizenship values 
are still in the process of developing.
Emotions
Interest in the role of emotions in civic and political engagement has grown in 
recent years. A wide range of emotions has now been studied in adults, either as 
motivators of political and civic action, as factors that emerge during the course of 
action, or as consequences of action (Capelos, 2013; Capelos & Exadaktylos, 2015, 
2017; Goodwin, Jasper & Polletta, 2004). For example, Omoto and Snyder (1995) 
found that the duration of voluntary service in the health field is predicted by emo-
tions such as feeling a humanitarian obligation to help others, enjoyment in helping 
others, a feeling of community concern, and also by the personal satisfaction that 
is derived from engaging in voluntary service. Likewise, Jasper (1998) argues that 
emotions play an important role in collective protest. He notes that individuals 
can initially experience emotions that motivate them to join protest groups, and 
that other emotions are then formed or reinforced during the course of collective 
action itself. These emotions may be transitory context-specific emotions, usually 
reactions to information and events, or they may be more stable affective bonds 
and loyalties between members of the protest group. Negative emotions such as 
anger have also been found to play a significant role in motivating collective action 
(Leach, Iyer & Pedersen, 2006; Smith, Cronin & Kessler, 2008; van Zomeren 
et al., 2004). However, other emotions such as fear may co-exist with action-moti-
vating emotions and suppress the role of those emotions and inhibit action-taking 
(Miller, Cronin, Garcia & Branscombe, 2009).
Most of the roles that emotions can play in the civic and political participation 
of adults have not yet been extensively studied in youth. However, it is known 
that 10-year-olds in both Canada and Taiwan are more likely to engage in envi-
ronmental actions if they feel fear, anger and concern about current environ-
mental issues (Huang & Yore, 2005). Youth volunteering has also been found to 
be linked to emotions: Bringle (2015) found that, in American college students, 
empathic anger (i.e., feeling angry about injustice or inequity to other people 
who are not family or friends) is associated both with a social justice orientation 
to community involvement and with levels of charitable activity (i.e., helping 
those in need) and advocacy (i.e., working to change public policy for the ben-
efit of other people). Finally, van Zomeren et al. (2004) found that group-based 
anger is a strong predictor of the willingness to participate in collective protests 
about an injustice, a result that was obtained in three separate studies conducted 
with 20-year-old Dutch university students.
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In general, females tend to score higher than males on altruism, empathy 
and social responsibility (Wilson, 2000). Young females, in particular, appear 
to understand that they are usually viewed as being more compassionate than 
men (Gordon & Taft, 2011); however, they themselves do not always accept 
this attribute. Taft (2010) found that they tend not to hold these gender stereo-
typed attributes in great esteem, partly because compassion has been associated 
with other attributes such as being ‘dreamy’ and ‘hopeful’ as part of a superficial 
female identity. Anger, on the other hand, is more commonly associated with 
males and is often regarded as being a socially unacceptable emotion for females 
(Brown, 1999).
Further feelings that have been examined in relationship to patterns of civic 
and political engagement are those that young people have towards their own 
nation. CIVED (Amadeo et al., 2002; Torney-Purta et al., 2001) found that most 
youth have positive feelings towards their nation at both 14 years of age and 17–18 
years of age. A more fine-grained analysis of the data from the 14-year-olds from 
five Western European and five Eastern European countries by Torney-Purta 
(2009) revealed that these students could be grouped into five distinct clusters 
based on their feelings and attitudes across a range of issues: a conventional-political 
cluster of individuals who had positive feelings towards their nation, believed 
that governments had social responsibilities and believed that adults should be 
active in both conventional politics and civic activities; a social justice cluster who 
believed in rights for everyone but did not feel obliged to do anything about 
them beyond voting; an indifferent cluster who did not think much about being 
active in politics at all; a disaffected cluster who were similar to the indifferent clus-
ter but felt more negatively about the rights of others and about being involved 
in the community; and an alienated cluster who did not believe in norms of citizen 
participation, were alienated from politics and did not believe in the rights of 
others. It was noticeable that positive feelings towards the nation were associ-
ated with valuing conventional politics and civic activities in both Western and 
Eastern European countries.
Finally, a wide range of negative emotions and their links to civic and politi-
cal participation were examined by Pachi and Barrett (2012b) in their analysis 
of survey data collected from 16- to 26-year-old British Bangladeshi, Congolese 
and English youth as part of PIDOP. They looked in particular at negative emo-
tions (e.g., anger, frustration, worry, shame) that were based on beliefs about 
specific issues (e.g., discrimination, environmental issues). They found differ-
ences in these emotions according to the demographic characteristics of the indi-
viduals, as well as differences in the relationships between these emotions and 
various forms of participation. Females appeared to have more pronounced nega-
tive emotions about both environmental issues and discrimination than males, 
while the older youth had more pronounced negative emotions than the younger 
youth about discrimination. However, negative emotions about environmental 
issues predicted volunteering only among the Bangladeshi youth, while nega-
tive emotions predicted expected future illegal non-conventional participation 
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(e.g., spraying graffiti) and lower levels of voting only among the Congolese 
youth. In the case of the English youth, their negative emotions were linked to 
a lower likelihood of using the Internet for political and civic purposes. In other 
words, different patterns of relationships between emotions and participation 
emerged in the three ethnic groups.
The implication is that it is important to examine emotions in relationship to 
specific issues in specific ethnic groups. We are therefore reminded once again 
that the psychological factors related to civic and political participation are often 
specific to specific subgroups of youth living within specific sociocultural and 
societal contexts. Young people’s civic and political concerns and interests, and 
the ways in which they respond to these, clearly vary considerably across both 
demographic groupings and settings. Findings of studies therefore need to be 
interpreted cautiously, without overgeneralising conclusions beyond the evi-
dence base that is actually available.
Conclusions
This chapter has reviewed a large number of psychological factors that are related 
to young people’s civic and political engagement. These factors include: politi-
cal knowledge; political attentiveness; political interest; internal, external and 
collective efficacy; the perceived effectiveness of participatory actions; personal, 
social and collective identities; social, political and institutional trust; values; 
beliefs about good citizenship; and emotions. As we have seen, in some cases 
there is evidence that these factors influence young people’s patterns of civic and 
political engagement. However, as we have also seen, civic or political participa-
tion itself can also sometimes have a causal effect on these psychological factors, 
strengthening or weakening them depending on the factor and the form of par-
ticipation involved.
This review of psychological factors has revealed a number of unresolved issues 
that will need to be addressed by future research. First, we have seen that the 
relationship between psychological factors and participation can vary from one 
country to another (e.g., the ICCS 2016 finding that, within different countries, 
political knowledge relates differently to participation in civic activities within 
the school and to future expected political participation). It is unclear why dif-
ferent relationships between psychological factors and participation should arise 
in different countries. For example, this might be due to different parental or 
teacher attitudes to youth participation in different countries, different political 
and policy discourses concerning youth participation in different countries, dif-
ferent meanings that are attributed by youth to the various forms of participation 
in different countries, etc. The sources of this cross-national variability clearly 
require further research.
Likewise, we still do not properly understand the variability in psychological 
factors that is associated with demographic characteristics such as SES, gender, 
ethnicity and age. It is one thing to identify the existence of these demographic 
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differences and it is another to explain them. It may well be the case that the vari-
ability stems from the different experiences that individuals belonging to differ-
ent demographic subgroups have encountered in the family, in the peer group or 
in the school. We need to understand why these differences occur (and in some 
cases, why they occur in some countries but not in others). Future research will 
also need to be sensitive to the possibility that differences occur between differ-
ent subgroups that are defined not in terms of a single demographic characteristic 
(such as SES or gender) on its own, but in terms of the intersection between 
nation, ethnicity, gender, age, SES and locale. We will return to some of these 
issues concerning demographic factors in the following chapter.
There has also been very little research to date into young people’s under-
standing of legality and the rule of law in the context of civic and political 
engagement. As we have seen, the distinction between legal and illegal forms of 
action can have consequences for some young people’s willingness to engage in 
certain kinds of actions, but precisely how their understanding of the law relates 
to their participatory behaviours is poorly understood at the present time.
Other under-investigated issues include how young people perceive the power 
relationships that exist between the various actors who operate at different levels 
of the political hierarchy, and how they perceive their own relationships to these 
actors. Their perceptions of adult norms concerning active citizenship, and their 
views regarding obedience to these norms, have also not yet been widely investi-
gated. Further research is also required into the way in which young people’s mul-
tiple identities interact with each other to drive their civic and political behaviours.
Finally, a large cluster of unresolved issues arises in connection with the cau-
sality that operates in this domain. As we have seen, there are sometimes recip-
rocal relationships between civic and political participation on the one hand 
and psychological factors such as internal efficacy, political interest and identity 
style on the other. This raises the broader question of the causality that operates 
between all of the psychological factors and civic and political participation. 
Further research is required to unpack the complex patterns of causal relation-
ships that no doubt exist between the various psychological factors themselves and 
between the psychological factors and participatory behaviours. Furthermore, 
this research will once again need to be sensitive to the possibility that these 
causal relationships differ in different demographic subgroups as defined through 
the intersection between nation, ethnicity, gender, age, SES and locale. Such 
research will need to use longitudinal designs to follow the development of not 
only psychological factors but also civic and political behaviours through adoles-
cence and early adulthood, as it is only longitudinal research that can produce a 
proper understanding of the causality that operates in this domain.
In the next chapter, we will add further complexity to this analysis by review-
ing what is known about the relationship between young people’s civic and 
political engagement and social and demographic factors.
